Commonwealth v. Worzel: a judge keeps discretion over DUI ARD violations

On October 1, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a judge supervising a DUI defendant in Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) is not required to terminate the program and send the case back to the prosecutor every time the defendant violates a condition. The judge keeps the discretion that Pa.R.Crim.P. 318(C) gives, including the option to extend supervision. The decision affects anyone in or facing a DUI ARD program, and it settles a conflict between a statute and a court rule.

By John A. Julian, Esq. Updated October 1, 2026.

The short version

• The question. Section 3807(e)(2) of the Vehicle Code says that when a DUI defendant in ARD violates a condition, the court "shall direct the attorney for the Commonwealth to proceed on the charges as prescribed in the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Rule 318(C) says the judge "may order, when appropriate," that ARD be terminated. Is termination mandatory in DUI cases?
• The answer. No. The statute's reference to the Rules of Criminal Procedure reasonably incorporates Rule 318(C), so a court that finds a violation may still decide, case by case, whether to terminate, extend, or otherwise continue the program.
• The result. The Superior Court's order was affirmed, which leaves in place the dismissal of the second prosecution the Commonwealth had filed after the defendant completed an extended ARD term.

What happened

Megan Danielle Worzel was arrested in Pike County in October 2020 on suspicion of DUI, with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit. It was her first offense, and she accepted the Commonwealth's offer of ARD. In June 2021 the court admitted her to the Pike County ARD program with six months of probation. Under the county's local ARD rules she could not possess or drink alcohol during that period. That condition is set by the county program, not by Section 3807.

With two weeks left in the program, a probation office drug test came back positive for alcohol, and she admitted drinking in a written statement. The Commonwealth moved to terminate her ARD. After a hearing in April 2022 the trial court found a violation but denied termination and instead extended her supervision by ninety days, noting that she had been forthcoming about her alcohol use and wanted further supervision and treatment. The Commonwealth's appeal was quashed because the order was not appealable. She completed the extension, and the probation office certified in July 2022 that she had completed ARD.

The Commonwealth nonetheless filed a new criminal information on the same DUI charges, arguing that the extension had been unlawful. Worzel moved under Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 to dismiss it, and the trial court granted the motion. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal in a unanimous published opinion, Commonwealth v. Worzel, 328 A.3d 1194 (Pa. Super. 2024), though it vacated part of the order directing the Commonwealth to file an expungement petition and sent that issue back under Rule 320, which makes expungement after dismissal automatic.

What the Supreme Court held

Justice Wecht wrote the opinion in Commonwealth v. Worzel, No. 36 MAP 2025 (Pa. Oct. 1, 2026). Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Mundy, and McCaffery joined it. Justice Brobson joined all of it except Part III.C.iv. By the opinion's structure that is the final section applying the rule of lenity, though the Court does not describe his reasons.

1. Both the statute and the rule apply

ARD began in 1972 as a creation of the Supreme Court's own rulemaking power, and the DUI-specific provisions were added by the General Assembly later, in the early 1980s and again in 2003. The Court held that those statutory requirements "do not displace" the Court's ARD rules. In every DUI ARD case, both Section 3807 and Chapter 3 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply.

2. The statute is ambiguous

The phrase "as prescribed in the Rules of Criminal Procedure" could modify either "shall direct" or "to proceed." If it modifies "to proceed," the Rules govern only how the prosecution goes forward. If it modifies "shall direct," the Rules, including Rule 318(C), govern how the court directs the Commonwealth, which preserves the judge's discretion. The Court found both readings equally reasonable, so the statute is ambiguous. It also noted that Section 3807(e)(2) defines more kinds of ARD violations than Rule 318 does, so the statute can be read as expanding what counts as a violation in DUI cases while leaving the Rule's remedy discretion intact.

3. Four tools resolve the ambiguity in the defendant's favor

• Constitutional avoidance. Under Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, laws are suspended to the extent they are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's procedural rules. Reading the statute to override Rule 318(C) would raise a separation-of-powers problem, and courts prefer the reading that avoids one. The Court also criticized both parties for not briefing that conflict.
• The statutory construction factors. ARD's primary purpose is rehabilitation, and the court is best placed to weigh a violation against the participant's progress. Mandatory termination would cost an otherwise compliant defendant the program over even a trivial violation, including a missed payment caused by poverty.
• Prior cases. Commonwealth v. Lutz, 495 A.2d 928 (Pa. 1985), and Commonwealth v. McCabe, 265 A.3d 1279 (Pa. 2021), treat the Court's ARD rules as controlling the procedure of the Vehicle Code's ARD program, and the Court's 2025 decision in Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 345 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2025), described Rule 318 and Section 3807(e) as consistent.
• The rule of lenity. Because ARD imposes financial and liberty burdens under threat of prosecution, Section 3807 is a penal statute, and doubt about its scope goes to the accused.

What the Court did not decide

• The constitutional conflict itself. The Court did not decide whether the General Assembly could override Rule 318(C). It used the possible conflict to choose between two readings and called the question "perilous."
• Whether termination is appropriate in any given case. The decision preserves discretion. It does not say a judge must be lenient, and violations involving new offenses or serious conduct may well warrant termination.
• Appeals from a termination decision. Rule 318(C) says no appeal is allowed from the order, and the Court did not revisit that.

What this means for an ARD participant

If a violation is alleged, the hearing under Rule 318 is where the outcome is decided, and the judge has real options. The evidence that mattered to the trial court in this case is a useful guide: honesty about the violation, willingness to accept more supervision or treatment, and a record of otherwise complying. Anyone facing a motion to terminate ARD should treat that hearing as the whole case, because the order that follows generally cannot be appealed. If the Commonwealth files charges again after an ARD term was completed under a court order, a motion to dismiss under Rule 319 is the vehicle, as it was here.

How this connects to post-conviction work

ARD is a pretrial program, and a person who completes it is not convicted. Where ARD is terminated and the case proceeds to a plea or trial, any conviction is subject to the ordinary rules on direct appeal and, later, the PCRA. A client who was told after a violation that termination was mandatory, and who then pleaded guilty, may have a question about counsel's advice, which would be assessed under the standards in our guide to ineffective assistance of counsel. That depends entirely on the record, and this decision does not itself reopen any case.

Common questions

Does a positive alcohol test automatically end DUI ARD in Pennsylvania?

No. Under Commonwealth v. Worzel (Pa. 2026), the judge who finds a violation keeps discretion under Rule 318(C) to terminate the program, extend it, or otherwise continue it. Section 3807(e)(2) does not make termination mandatory.

What did the Supreme Court say about Section 3807(e)(2)?

It held the statute ambiguous, because its reference to the Rules of Criminal Procedure can reasonably incorporate the discretion in Rule 318(C). The Court resolved the ambiguity using constitutional avoidance, the statutory construction factors, its prior cases, and the rule of lenity.

Can the Commonwealth re-file DUI charges after I finish an extended ARD term?

In this case the trial court dismissed the re-filed charges under Rule 319 and the Supreme Court left that dismissal in place, because the extension was a lawful exercise of discretion. Each case depends on its own record.

Can I appeal a decision to terminate my ARD?

Rule 318(C) states that no appeal is allowed from an order terminating ARD, and the Supreme Court did not change that. The hearing before the trial judge is the critical opportunity.